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ESSAY
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND
DECENTRALIZED DECISIONS

Tim Wu∗

I

INTRODUCTION

N 1945, Fredrick Hayek described the problem of economic
development as “a problem of the utilization of knowledge
not given to anyone in its totality.”1 Hayek’s insight has unexpected relevance for what has emerged as the central question
in modern intellectual property and related fields: When might
the assignment of property rights have anti-competitive consequences? The traditional, yet central, economic answer to this
question emphasizes a tradeoff between incentives created by
property grants and resulting higher prices and deadweight
losses.2 Under this model intellectual property grants are desirable to the extent that they encourage new product development at a reasonable cost.
Both the above quotation from Hayek and a growing body of
scholarship suggest that this is the wrong way to assess the
problem. This scholarship suggests that the most important
economic effects of intellectual property may not be effects on
price, but rather on industry structure. According to this view,
we must weigh the benefits of intellectual property assign∗ Professor, Columbia Law School. I thank Kevin Outterson, Richard Posner,
Randal Picker, Eric Posner, Mark Lemley, Lior Strahilevitz, Ed Felten, and Luis
Garicano for the discussion and ideas that led to this paper. I also thank the
participants in the Chicago Intellectual Property and Antitrust Seminar. This
paper was drafted with the financial support of the University of Chicago. A related draft was presented at UCLA Law School and the Chicago Law School
Work in Progress Workshop. I thank Wayne Hsiung for research assistance.
1 F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 520
(1945).
2 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1857, 1857–58 (2000) (discussing deadweight loss analysis and its limits).
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ments, which include subsidizing or making possible desirable
economic activity, against the costs of the centralization of economic decisionmaking and the creation of barriers to innovation and market entry.
This Essay discusses a crucial aspect of this problem: the effect of rights assignments on the decision architectures of affected industries.3 Industry decisionmaking is not a topic of
mere abstract interest. It is central to the economic performance of firms, industries, and entire nations. Professors Joseph
Stiglitz and Raaj Sah have argued that different systems of
product development may account for the variation in
performances of planned and market economies.5 Hayek similarly focused on decentralized versus centralized use of information as central to a “rational economic order.”6 To the extent
that intellectual property assignments affect product development decisionmaking, and to the extent such assignments
cover more and more industries, their effects may be fundamental to the performance of the economies of the future.
In the high-technology field, an example of the perils of centralized decisionmaking comes from Japan’s “Fifth Generation
Project.” In the 1980s, the Japanese government, consulting
with experts, predicted where computer technology would be in
ten years. The government then launched a huge national effort to build the predicted technologies, hoping to leapfrog
other countries. As a 1984 article explained,
3 Some of the work relied upon includes Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (2005); Jane Jacobs, The Nature of Economies (2000); Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management 113–24 (1992); Patrick Bolton & Mathias Dewatripont, The Firm as a Communication Network,
109 Q.J. Econ. 809 (1994); Luis Garicano, Hierarchies and the Organization of
Knowledge in Production, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 874 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 989
(1997); Raaj Kumar Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 716 (1986) [hereinafter
Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchries and Polyarchies]; Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz,
The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations,
106 Q.J. Econ. 289 (1991) [hereinafter Sah & Stiglitz, Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations]; David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 Am. Econ. Rev. 465 (1990).
5 See Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 716, 726.
6 See Hayek, supra note 1, at 524–28.
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[t]he Japanese are planning the miracle product. It will come
not from their mines, their wells, their fields, or even their
seas. It comes instead from their brains. . . . They’re going to
give the world the next generation—Fifth Generation—of
computers, and those machines are going to be intelligent.7

The project was, unfortunately, centered on the mistaken belief that mainframe computers would remain dominant and
that parallel supercomputing was the key to the future. It
completely missed other less grandiose innovations, like the
personal computer, the graphical user interface on the Apple
Macintosh, and the computer networking now called the
Internet. The project was an abject failure that damaged the
Japanese computer industry. “[F]ew of the Fifth Generation
project’s original goals were achieved: Critics pronounced it a
complete failure, while supporters were confined to citing collateral benefits such as researcher training.”8
These points offer an important warning for industries regulated by intellectual property. While we may accept that intellectual property offers strong ex ante incentives to innovate (as
did the Fifth Generation project), there is a flip-side danger of
too much centralization of decisionmaking. Though the risk
posed by governmental initiatives like Japan’s Fifth Generation project may seem foreign, intellectual property policies
practiced in the United States historically have created similar
consequences. For example, in 1892, the United States granted
an exceptionally broad patent to Thomas Edison for his light
bulb. The result was to centralize light bulb decisionmaking in
the Edison company for approximately twelve years.9 The re7 See Edward Feigenbaum & Pamela McCorduck, The Fifth Generation: Japan’s Computer Challenge to the World, Creative Computing, Aug. 1984, at 103,
104,
available
at
http://www.atarimagazines.com/creative/v10n8/103_The_fifth_generation_Jap.p
hp.
8 See Joel West, Utopianism and National Competitiveness in Technology
Rhetoric: The Case of Japan’s Information Infrastructure, 12 Info. Soc’y 251,
256(1996). I thank Ed Felten for this point.
9 See Arthur A. Bright, Jr., The Electric-Lamp Industry: Technological Change
and Economic Development from 1800 to 1947, at 88–91 (1949); Robert P.
Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 839, 885–88 (1990).

104

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 92:nnn

sults were not inspiring. Improvement in incandescent lighting
became a one-company show, and many competitors were put
out of business. Economists who have studied the period note
that technological progress in lighting slowed, as “the broad
Edison patent slowed down progress in the incandescent lighting field.”10
The economic literature on decisionmaking architectures
aids understanding of these scenarios. It makes an important
and useful distinction between hierarchical (centralized) and
polyarchical (decentralized) decision architectures.11 In the
former, decisions are made centrally by a few individuals with
others providing support. A polyarchy, conversely, is characterized by multiple, potentially competing decisionmakers who
may undertake projects independently. The key point of this
Essay is that the government’s decisions with respect to property assignments can steer decision architectures toward a
polyarchical or hierarchical architecture. In general, broad
rights or rights held by a limited number of parties promote a
hierarchical decision architecture. Conversely, diffuse rights or
non-assignment of rights leads to the market default: polyarchical decisionmaking architectures, where any firm or individual may decide to undertake a new project.
This distinction gives us a new perspective on when intellectual property rights should be assigned and their optimal
scope. In general, the economic literature strongly favors decentralized decision structures in economic systems, based on
the observation that free-market economies perform better
than planned, centralized economies. Even accepting that useful incentives can be created by intellectual property, the effects on decisionmaking suggest a reason to be cautious about
the assignment of broad rights. The danger is that centralization of investment decisionmaking may block the best or most
innovative ideas from coming to market. This concern must be
weighed against the desirable incentives and subsidies created
by an intellectual property grant.

10
11

Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 887.
See, e.g., Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 716.
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Two points must be raised against this presumption in favor
of decentralized architectures. First, the danger of overcentralization can be moderated by numerous policies. The
various exceptions and limitations to copyright and patent,
such as the improvement doctrine in patent or the fair use doctrine in copyright, can help serve this function. One insight of
this Essay is to suggest that the primary importance of such
doctrines should be understood differently. They must be understood as justified by their promotion of decentralized
decisionmaking in product development.
Second, despite this presumption in favor of decentralization, there also are certain scenarios where the economic literature suggests that hierarchical structures may perform better. Given an initial mixture of good and bad (profitable and
unprofitable) ideas, hierarchies will tend to filter out too many
good ideas but make fewer mistakes. Decentralized polyarchies, meanwhile, invest in more bad projects, and even outright fiascoes, but also more new and innovative ideas. There
may be certain industries where avoidance of errors is of preeminent importance; for example, experiments with dangerous
viruses or nuclear energy. In such instances, there may be special reasons to favor hierarchical product development.
Part I will introduce the distinction between hierarchies and
polyarchical decision architectures. Part II will discuss the relationship between intellectual property and innovation policy.
Part III will ask how the analysis in this Essay might influence intellectual property policy.
I. DECENTRALIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION
The economic literature has developed an overwhelming
bias in favor of decentralized economic decisionmaking, reflecting the disastrous economic performance of planned economies. The basic argument was made most memorably by
Fredrick Hayek and goes as follows.12 Centralized economic
planning, in a world of perfect information, has clear advantages over decentralized decisionmaking. Ideally, it eliminates
duplication: two gas stations on a single street corner, provid12

See Hayek, supra note 1, at 519, 524.
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ing the same function, are wasteful, or “rent-dissipating.” Central planning also eliminates many market failures such as externalities, collective action problems, and so on. The problem
with centralized planning is not that it would not be efficient.
The problem, rather, is that no central planner can possibly
have all of the necessary local and national information to
make the right decisions. As Hayek wrote:

If we possess all the relevant information, if we can start out
from a given system of preferences and if we command complete knowledge of available means, the problem which remains is purely one of logic. . . . This, however, is emphatically not the economic problem which society faces. . . . [T]he
“data” from which the economic calculus starts are never for
the whole society “given” to a single mind which could work
out the implications, and can never be so given.13
The failure to appreciate these points in the twentieth century
arguably led to various failed decisional experiments, such as
China’s Great Leap Forward or Stalin’s five-year plans.
Since Hayek’s time, other economists have taken new interest in the problems of decisionmaking and the transmission of
information within organizations. As for Hayek, the central
question across a variety of contexts is how performance is affected by centralization or decentralization of decisionmaking
authority. For example, given a manufacturing firm that must
choose among products to invest in developing, will the firm be
more profitable if (1) decentralized units decide on products, or
(2) every project is approved by a centralized structure before
resources are committed?
The contemporary economic literature begins with a central
assumption—one often missing from the existing legal intellectual property literature. The assumption is that human decisions are fallible.14 Decisionmakers act on imperfect information for a number of reasons, including limited time and the

Id. at 519.
See Raaj K. Sah, Fallibility in Human Organizations and Political Systems,
J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1991, at 67, 67–68 (discussing the assumption of human
fallibility).
13
14

Intellectual Property
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costs and erroneous nature of information transmission.15 As a
result, they make many mistakes. They cannot be certain, in
advance, which of a portfolio of new products will actually be
profitable and warrant investment. Product development and
innovation, based on this simple assumption, is a highly errorprone exercise.
Based on that premise, economists have distinguished two
basic decision architectures designed to weed out errors: polyarchies and hierarchies, corresponding to decentralized and
centralized structures, respectively.16 A polyarchy is a completely decentralized decision architecture: any single actor’s
approval of a project is sufficient. Conversely, in a hierarchy,
the approval architecture is modeled as a serial
decisionmaking process requiring all parties to approve a project for it to go forward. The simplest two-actor versions of
each of these decision architectures can be pictured as follows
in Figure 1
Polyarchy

Hierarchy
Rejected

A

Potential
Projects

Developed
Projects

Potential
Projects

A

B

Developed
Projects

B
Rejected

Rejected

Figure 1: Polyarchy and Hierarchy
See Bolton & Dewatripont, supra note 4, at 809–11.
For more detailed models of polyarchies and hierarchies, see, for example,
Patrick Bolton & Joseph Farrell, Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay, 98 J.
Pol. Econ. 803, 803–06 (1990); Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 716.
15
16
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As discussed above, a critical assumption is that in both systems, choosing successful products is difficult (this matches
the real world, where a small percentage of new products succeed).17 The relevant decisionmakers make two types of mistakes: they filter out projects that are in fact profitable (what
statisticians call Type I errors) and also fail to squash projects
destined to fail (Type II errors). The difference, then, is in the
kinds of errors that dominate in a hierarchy and polyarchy.
Under basic assumptions, a polyarchy like that described here
will generally approve more projects than a hierarchy.18 This
can be shown intuitively based on the diagram above. If for a
given project P, both A and B have a fifty percent chance of
approving it, the polyarchy will approve the project seventypercent of the time, while the hierarchy will approve it twentyfive percent of the time. As a result, the polyarchy will commit
fewer errors of a “missed-opportunity” nature (Type I errors),
but more errors of the “bad-investment” nature (Type II errors). The opposite is true for hierarchies: the cost of a hierarchy is a greater rejection of projects that should have been accepted.
Given their different capabilities, when will decentralized
decision architectures outperform hierarchies and vice versa?
That question is a topic of growing economic literature.19 An
17 See Booz, Allen & Hamilton Inc., New Products Management for the 1980s,
at 2–3 (1982) (showing that most new products fail). There is related literature
that tries to capitalize on a different mode of innovation to prevent errors,
namely innovations created by “lead users.” These users have particularized information as to how a product might be improved. See von Hippel, supra note 4,
at 22–23.
18 See Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 724–25.
19 Other authors have focused on the nature of the relevant information to be
transmitted as favoring either centralized or decentralized decisionmaking. Information that might be easier to transmit (“hard” information), like numbers,
can be handled well by a hierarchy, while “soft” information, such as a subjective assessment of managerial ability, might be better processed by decentralized actors. See Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production and Capital Allocation:
Decentralized Versus Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. Fin. 1891, 1891–93 (2002). Patrick Bolton and Joseph Farrell also have emphasized the relative quickness of
centralized decisionmaking structures, which seems less important in the intellectual property context. See Bolton & Farrell, supra note 16, at 805–06, 816.
This literature is not relevant here.
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early but important answer to this question focuses on the
relative scarcity of profitable ideas. Professors Joseph Stiglitz
and Raaj Sah demonstrated that a polyarchy should be expected to outperform a hierarchy in an environment where
profitable ideas are scarce and vice versa.20 The reasoning follows from the premise: Since polyarchies by design reject fewer
projects, they manage to capture the few available profitable
ideas. Conversely, where good ideas are plentiful, polyarchies
create waste by approving too many bad projects. A useful corollary is that the performance of a polyarchy or hierarchy depends on the information environment.21 In a period of great
change or uncertainty, the most fruitful line of inquiry may be
difficult to ascertain, making the ability of polyarchies to turn
up innovative ideas particularly useful. Conversely, in a highly
stable environment, accuracy may be more important.22
This work, as we will see, has direct relevance to intellectual
property problems.23 But before exploring those questions we
turn first to the traditional framework for understanding the
relationship between intellectual property and innovation.
See Sah & Stiglitz, Hierarchies and Polyarchies, supra note 4, at 719.
Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, Nobel Prize Lecture (Dec. 8, 2001), in Les Prix Nobel, The Nobel Prizes
2001, at 472, 503–06 (Tore Frangsmyr ed., 2002), available at
http://nobelprize.org/economics/laureates/2001/stiglitz-lecture.pdf
(discussing
the effects of asymmetric information on behavior of individuals in the market).
22 The evolutionary economics literature reaches similar results, albeit based
on different assumptions and models that will not be detailed here. Professors
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter emphasized the uncertainty and contingency
of technological outcomes. Their models predict multiple possible equilibria,
rather than a single, predictable outcome. See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G.
Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 14–16 (1982). Firms depend on a set of routines that survive unless the firm dies or manages to mutate
its way of doing business. That suggests, as does the decentralization literature,
the importance of a trial-and-error approach to innovation decisionmaking in
uncertain information environments.
23 In other work, Sah and Stiglitz also showed that hierarchies tend to vary in
quality much more than polyarchies. See Sah & Stiglitz, Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations, supra note 4, at 289–90. In other words, a good hierarchical decisionmaking architecture will perform far better than a polyarchy,
but a bad hierarchy makes the worst decisions of all. This is similar to the old
point that the best monarchy is better than the best democracy, but the worst
monarchy is worse than the worst democracy. Polyarchies in this view have
something of a leveling effect on the quality of decisionmaking.
20
21
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II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION

A. Costs and Benefits of Intellectual Property
The classic analysis of intellectual property and innovation
is a comparison of dynamic benefits and static costs.24 The
benefit of a government’s promise to grant intellectual property rights is the creation of incentives to invest in the research and development of new products. The static costs are
measured as consumer deadweight loss resulting from higher
pricing, the result of market power conferred by intellectual
property. The optimal assignment of intellectual property
rights must balance the incentives created against the deadweight loss. The graph usually used to show the costs of intellectual property is pictured in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The Costs of Intellectual Property
This model remains the starting point, but today few believe
that it delivers a full picture of the costs or benefits of intellectual property. The critical economic scholarship can be divided
into three categories: one group emphasizing neglected costs,
another group, neglected benefits, and a third challenging the
model itself. On the cost side, a major insight is that property
24

Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 32–45 (6th ed. 2003).

2006]

Intellectual Property

111

rights can potentially create barriers to market entry. In patent, a number of authors have suggested that firms build patent “thickets” that block their more innovative competitors.25
Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg have highlighted transaction costs made necessary by the collection of
rights—what they term an “anti-commons” problem.26 In other
articles, Professor Randy Picker and I have written on the use
of copyright to mediate or block the market entry of new dissemination technologies.27
On the benefit side, a number of scholars have suggested
that the assignment of intellectual property rights may have
static benefits—that IP rights may be useful independent of
any incentives created. This remains a highly controversial
proposition. The first to advance the argument was Professor
Edmund Kitch, who argued that broad patent grants create
“prospects” that can eliminate wasteful duplicative research
and promote orderly development of a new invention.28 Kitch’s
premise was disputed by Professors Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, based on a series of case studies of industries under broad patents.29 Professor William Landes and Judge
Richard Posner, while parting company with Kitch over the
usefulness of prospect patents, do nonetheless emphasize the
static benefits of intellectual property in other contexts, stress-

25 See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox
Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry,
1979–1995, 32 RAND J. Econ. 101, 102 (2001).
26 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 698–700 (1998), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/280/5364/698.
27 See Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 Antitrust Bull. 423 (2002); Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications
Policy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 278, 341–66 (2004).
28 See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & Econ. 265, 265–66, 278 (1977); see also Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev. 305, 308 (1992) (arguing
that the purpose of patent is primarily preventing rent dissipation); Martin
Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, An Empirical Study of the Patent Prospect
Theory: An Evaluation of Antispam Patents 1–5 (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=796289.
29 Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 871–78, 884–915.
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ing reductions of transaction costs.30 Professor Clarisa Long
has suggested that patents may be used by firms to signal
their technological prowess.31 Professor Douglas Lichtman’s
work also emphasizes static benefits, including pricecoordination functions of intellectual property and evidentiary
functions of copyright.32 These static justifications for intellectual property are not accepted by everyone. Professor Mark
Lemley, for example, calls them “ex post” justifications that
are “strikingly anti-market.”33
Finally, some challenge the economic assumptions underlying the model or address different models. Edmund Kitch, for
example, is skeptical that the demand curve for intellectual
propery-based products will have a negative slope and questions the assumption that intellectual property rights create
real market power.34 Mark Lemley suggests the model that
fails to direct sufficient attention to how intellectual property
law treats improvers, as opposed to the original inventors.35
Building on this literature, both in this Essay and other
work,36 I argue that we should assess intellectual property assignments by their effects on industry structure. In this model,
the chief benefit of intellectual property is to subsidize selected
industries whose assets are vulnerable to misappropriation.
The chief costs are (1) the use of intellectual property rights to
block or delay the market entry of threats to intellectual property owners, and (2) the centralization of decisionmaking
30 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law 12–13, 318–25 (2003); Douglas Lichtman, Property
Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. Legal Stud. 615, 619–20
(2000).
31 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 627–28, 643–44
(2002).
32 See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 Duke L.J. 683,
686–87 (2003) (describing sections of copyright as motivated by an evidentiary
function); Lichtman, supra note 31, at 619 (arguing that intellectual property
law should encourage price coordination in emerging technology contexts).
33 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 132 (2004).
34 See Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic
Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1727, 1729–31 (2000).
35 Lemley, supra note 4, at 1048–67.
36 See Wu, supra note 27; Timothy Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 Sup. Ct.
Rev. (forthcoming 2006).
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within the industry. The intuition is not that other costs and
benefits described in the literature are irrelevant, but rather
that they are less significant to national economic performance
than the long-term effects on industry structure.
The remainder of this section develops point (2) above by
providing a means for assessing how intellectual property assignments may affect an industry’s decisionmaking.

B. Model of Intellectual Property and Investment Decisions
The model presented here assesses intellectual property independent of the costs and benefits central to the monopoly
pricing model. It assumes, initially, that both the incentives
and deadweight losses are inconsequential in a competitive
market.37 The purpose is to emphasize a neglected consequence—the effect of property assignments on product development decisions in the industries influenced by intellectual
property. The central argument is that the government’s assignment of property rights can influence the decisionmaking
architecture for the economic system surrounding a given intellectual property grant.
Consider an invention Y that will be a necessary component
for a portfolio of possible products, named P1 . . . Pn. Some of
the products will be profitable, others not, but consistent with
our assumptions of imperfect information their profitability is
hard to know in advance.
The government in our model has two policy options: (1) to
award a patent to F1 (the inventor) or (2) not to award this protection. The patent in this model gives F1 an inalienable right
to enjoin the use of Y. The right, in other words, cannot be licensed—like most of the royal grant of letters patent in seventeenth-century England.38 Should the government decide to
award the patent, the decisional consequences of that decision
are as follows: F1 has the sole authority to decide which of

37 This is an unrealistic assumption for most industries. The assumption is relaxed in Part III.
38 The assumption is relaxed later in this Part. For a description of the workings of English letters patent, see Thomas Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism,
and the Politics of Regulation, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1313, 1324–27 (2005).
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P1 . . . Pn is profitable and should be developed. While it can so-

licit advice and so on, the government, in our model, has
mandated through patent that the final decision is F1’s to
make. The resulting decision architecture can be pictured in
Figure 3.

Potential
Projects

F1

Developed
Projects

Rejected

Figure 3: Decisional Consequences of Awarding Patent
Conversely, if government does not award a patent in Y,
then a set of firms F1. . . Fn can decide to develop whatever
products P1. . . Pn they think are profitable. That decision architecture is pictured in Figure 4 below.

Rejected

F1

F2
Potential
Projects

Developed
Projects
F3

Fn
Rejected

Figure 4: Decisional Consequences of Not Awarding Patent
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A natural question is whether policy (1) or (2) will lead to
higher profit and better economic performance. The consequence that this model emphasizes is the effect on the decision
architecture surrounding invention Y. The results of the government’s decision will be a wholly different pattern of product
innovation and development. The centralized and decentralized decision structures will yield investments in different
portfolios of products yielding different economic outcomes.
Over time, the history of the industry dependent on Y may
look very different.
A simple historical example may help illustrate the model.
Consider an industry like the latenineteenth-century automobile industry, headed by a promising invention like the automobile.39 In 1895, the U.S. government granted a patent in the
automobile to a man named George Selden. It decided to allocate to Selden the authority to decide whether any project involving the basic elements of a car (an internal-combustion engine connected to a drive shaft) would go forward.40 By this
decision, the government created an initial decisional architecture for the automobile sector: a perfect hierarchy. Selden held
the theoretical right to decide what projects to approve or disapprove in the car industry. Though there are many ideas as
to what a profitable car might be, the power to make that decision rested entirely with Selden.41
At this point we can understand clearly the difference between the present model and the classic model. The idea that
patent or copyright can block competition is a familiar part of
the classic model. Yet its effect has been understood as blocking price competition, leading to deadweight loss. What the
model here suggests is slightly different. It emphasizes the
blocking of decisionmaking capacity among potential competitors to the rights holder. That is, the relevance of an intellectual property grant is not only that competitors cannot com-

This example also is discussed in Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 888–91.
U.S. Patent No. 549,160 (issued Nov. 5, 1895).
41 As Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have documented, one could readily
speculate that the effect of the Selden patent was to slow the development of
automobiles for quite some time. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 888–90.
39
40
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pete on price, but that they cannot develop projects that they
consider profitable without the permission of the rights-owner.
***
The most unrealistic assumption of the model just described
is that the patent right in question cannot be transferred or licensed. While inalienable rights were usually the original
model of royal letters patent42 and still exist to some extent,
inalienable rights are no longer the dominant model. In U.S.
patent and copyright law, the initial allocation of
decisionmaking authority is not a final allocation.43 The rights
holder can either create a decentralized decision structure
within his own firm or license others to use the invention in an
open manner, if doing so would yield maximum profitability.
What happens when we relax the assumption of inalienability? This leads to an analysis of what decisions the rights
holder will make. The two questions are (1) whether the rights
holder will create an efficiently decentralized internal structure44 and (2) whether the rights holder will license efficiently
to create an optimal decisional structure. A basic insight is
that the initial inventor will often but not always create either
an efficient internal structure or license when doing so would
be socially optimal.
The first question suggests that to the extent that overly
centralized decisionmaking might be sub-optimal, we might
expect the rights holder to create a decentralized product development system within the firm. Unfortunately, the challenges of creating decentralized structures within firms are
well known.45 The reason is that minimal firm coherence requires uniformity in many practices, such as personnel, firm
culture, and other internal rules. The resulting in-firm decentralization may be incomplete and artificial.46 Generally speakSee Nachbar, supra note 38, at 1326–27.
See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
44 The assumption of inalienability is irrelevant to this question.
45 See Richard A. Posner, Preventing Surprise Attacks: Intelligence Reform in
the Wake of 9/11, at 127–62 (2005).
46 For further discussion of the idea in the intelligence sector, see id. at 134–
38.
42
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ing, a system of competing firms better resembles a decentralized decisional architecture than a large firm that has created
internal decentralization.
The second question raises a familiar problem in both the
intellectual property and telecommunications literature: the
problem of efficient licensing.47 In general, we should expect a
firm to license its intellectual property to maximize subsequent innovation because that maximizes the licensing value
of the property in the first place.48 There are, however, a number of exceptions to this observation. We can consider three
scenarios where efficient licensing so as to create appropriately
decentralized decisionmaking may not occur.
The first may be found where the firm is subject to extensive
government pricing regulations. In such a case, a firm may
have strong reasons to want to keep its inventions to itself—
namely, the prospect of unregulated revenue.49 If, for example,
Bell’s central technology (voice) is subject to price caps, it may
keep a new technology (DSL) to itself to try and capture the
monopoly profits it is denied in its primary market. This point
is simply a corollary of Baxter’s law, which suggests that regulated monopolists, unlike other monopolists, may rationally
seek monopoly profits in vertical input industries.50
A second exception arises in the presence of positive public
externalities. These are scenarios where broad licensing would
be good for society but where the benefits are hard for the
rights holder to capture and even potentially harmful to it.51
47 For a discussion of where platform owners license efficiently, see Joseph
Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet
Age, 17 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 85, 97–101 (2003).
48 For a discussion of related issues, see Lemley, supra note 4.
49 Cf. Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in The Antitrust Revolution 290, 291–95 (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989) (describing how the Bell System
performed well and prospered under the regime of regulated monopoly).

50

See William F. Baxter, Conditions Creating Antitrust Concerns with Vertical
Integration by Regulated Industries--'For Whom the Bell Doctrine Tolls, '52
Antitrust L.J. 243 (1983) (describing what William Baxter modestly called the
“Bell Doctrine,” and what others call Baxter’s Law).

51 This view also is expressed in the argument that monopolists typically have
reduced incentives to innovate. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and
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This can happen when the inventing firm is a dominant firm
using the prior technology.52 For example, in the automobile
example, the owner of the car patent also might be a dominant
manufacturer of horse-drawn buggies. In that case, the manufacturer might want to screen inventions that might challenge
the buggy(like passenger sedans) favoring instead inventions
that are no challenge to its existing market position (like tractors). The history of copyright and communications technologies typifies this problem, where the holders of copyright block
or slow dissemination technologies of potentially broad social
value that threaten an existing market position.53 Television
broadcasters, for example, blocked cable television,54 and over
the last decade the existing radio industry has successfully
blocked the arrival of new “low-power” FM stations.55
The evolutionary economic literature provides particular insight into this problem with its distinction between “sustaining” and “disruptive” innovations.56 Those in the first category
simply make a present business model more efficient, like an
automatic transmission for a car or a record player that plays
music more clearly. Disruptive innovations, conversely,
threaten the market position of firms reliant on existing technology. The car did not improve but replaced the horse and
buggy, and as our Japanese friends found out, the personal
computer did not merely complement the mainframe, but ultimately replaced it. In such cases, broad licensing might be
socially efficient but also might mean the death of the licensthe Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 5 Collected Papers of Kenneth J.
Arrow: Production and Capital 104, 114–17 (1985) (concluding that the monopolist’s incentive to innovate is less than the inventor in competitive industries).
52 See Wu, supra note 27, at 292–95; Timothy Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141, 149–51 (2003) (explaining discrimination in the broadband context).
53 See Wu, supra note 27, at 292–95.
54 See id. at 311–24.
55 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, The Logic of Scarcity: Idle Spectrum as a First
Amendment Violation, 52 Duke L.J. 1, 16–17 (2002) (“The campaign against low
power FM led Bill Kennard, then Chair of the FCC, to comment sardonically
that ‘[t]he only real interference to Low Power FM radio is from high priced
Washington lobbyists.’”).
56 See Clayton M. Christensen & Michael E. Raynor, The Innovator’s Solution
34–35 (2003).
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ing firm because the firm may have no comparative advantage
using the new form of technology. Since few firms plan for
their own death, even if their death is in the public interest,
the temptation to bury a disruptive innovation may be strong
indeed.57
The third exception, consistent with our assumptions of human nature, is the effect of pride, laziness, or incompetence.
Granted a broad patent or copyright on a popular product, a
firm may simply refuse to license decentralized improvement
because it wants to retain maximum control and is comfortable
with its expected returns. It is, for example, rare to see multiple film versions of a given copyrighted novel, even though one
might expect that decentralized competition among films
might serve the public interest. On the patent side, the owner
of a patented invention may wrongly but proudly believe that
he alone possesses the insights to make the best improvements
and refuse to license decentralized improvement on that basis.
This is reportedly the stance taken by the Wright Brothers,
patent holders on several crucial inventions related to the airplane. As Professors Nelson and Merges put it:
[T]he Wright brothers were very interested in producing aircraft and in improving their design, and they did so actively.
However, there were other important people and companies
who wanted to enter the aircraft design and manufacture
business. They had their own ideas about how to advance the
design of aircraft, and they strongly resisted being blocked
by the Wright patent.58

Human error, in short, is not the exception but the rule, and
its absence in licensing practice would be surprising. The more
general point is this: Where licensing is possible, the effects of
a grant of rights may be hard to predict, as it depends on a
rights holder’s attitude toward decentralized improvement.
Conversely, the effects of non-assignment are more predictable. This point is developed in the remainder of this Essay.

57
58

Id.
Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 890.
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III. A HAYEKIAN APPROACH TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The Essay so far has sought to establish that decisions related to assignment of intellectual property rights can help
centralize or decentralize decisionmaking relevant to intellectual property dependent products. But what can this analysis
can tell us about intellectual property policy in general?
This final Part discusses three areas where the approach of
this Essay might make an impact on intellectual property
questions.

A. Subject Matter
The government is often faced with decisions as to whether
intellectual property should exist at all, either for an industry
or for a type of product or invention. With the arrival of every
new industry—automobiles, airplanes, software, computers,
internet auctions—there is always some question as to
whether or when intellectual property rights of some form
should attach. Over the last several decades, for example, the
patentability of software, living creatures, and business methods has been controversial.59 The analysis here shows that
these problems can be reframed as a choice about the decision
architecture for the industry in question.
Consistent with the Hayekian analysis used here, the presumption should run against assigning intellectual property
rights in new industries. The reason is decisional: Decentralized industry structures seem to have the strongest track record for inculcating innovation and economic growth. The absence of intellectual property rights, absent additional
significant barriers to market entry, should yield the default
result of a decentralized decision architecture.
The giant exception to this presumption is where the industry in question faces serious prospects of asset misappropriation that will deter investment. Drawing investment into an
industry that could not exist absent protection is the strongest
59 See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 577, 581–84 (1999) (discussing the evolution of patent’s subject matter coverage).
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reason to grant intellectual property rights. But absent evidence of such a problem, the analysis here suggests that the
assignment of intellectual property rights will hinder, rather
than foster, optimal product development and consequently
economic growth.
Two examples illustrate this reasoning. Business-method
patents were first authorized by the Federal Circuit in 1998.60
The court decided that the inventor of a new method of business could obtain a patent just like any other inventor. A major consequence of business-method patents, if widespread, is
decisional in nature. They can flip the basic decentralized nature of deciding how to run a business and improve it in a
given industry. For example, if Federal Express were awarded
a patent on its (once innovative) overnight delivery business
method, it would become a centralized decision maker as to the
future of overnight delivery services. It is true that having a
single courier company eliminates some errors and duplication
of resources, but this comes at the cost of suppressing new
ideas for improving the overnight courier method. This cost,
moreover, often will be unjustified by any particular danger
that the danger of misappropriation will destroy the industry
absent government protection.
A second example is broadcast spectrum reform, which has
been under consideration for about a decade in the United
States. The question is whether broadcasting at certain frequencies should be propertized. In other words, the question is
whether some firm should own the alienable rights to
broadcast between frequencies X and Y. The impact of the government’s decision whether to grant property rights or not will
have important decisional consequences. Granting no rights
will create decentralized market entry for spectrum-dependent
projects or technologies.61 Any entity willing to make the investment may develop a project that depends on access to
spectrum, albeit at the cost of many failed projects. Granting
government-specified licenses or property rights, conversely,
60 See State St. Bank & Trust. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1375–
77 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
61 In a centralized economy, the default option is a hierarchy—that is, a decision by a government planner.
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makes some kind of hierarchical decision structure possible in
the first place. That is, we should expect to see greater screening of spectrum-dependent projects or technologies before they
are launched.
Which is better is slightly ambigious. For some uses of spectrum there may be good arguments for a hierarchical, centralized authority who decides what the spectrum will be used for,
perhaps to ensure public safety. But otherwise, whether we
want propertized spectrum depends on whether there is any
argument that spectrum-dependent projects be carefully
screened. Absent risk the public, the answer must sometimes
be no.
This, of course, cannot be the end of the analysis. But the insights about the strength of decentralized decisionmaking
should at least make policy makers think carefully before assigning rights that might distort the market.

B. Exceptions
The study of decision architectures gives us a new way to
understand the relevance of the major exceptions to copyright
and patent law. The exceptions have strong decisional consequences. They amount to a governmental decision not to award
property rights in a narrow instance and can therefore force a
decentralized decision architecture surrounding the exception.
For example, in copyright, the contributory rule of Sony v.
Universal Studios exempts devices with “substantial noninfringing uses,” like VCRs, from liability under copyright.62 This
rule allocates decisionmaking authority over whether a new
project that depends on copyrighted works may go forward. In
practice, it affects whether a manufacturer like Sony or TiVo
may design products independent of the film industry’s ap-

62 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 441–42, 456
(1984). The Supreme Court reconsidered and revised this rule in MGM Studios
v. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 (2005), holding that one who distributes a device for the purpose of promoting its use to infringe copyright is liable for resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, despite the device’s
lawful uses.
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proval, or whether it must ultimately turn to a centralized industry for permission.63
A second example is the allowance of “improvement” patents
in patent law. Courts have generally allowed later-in-time inventors to receive patents based on significant improvements
to an existing invention.64 Thomas Edison’s light bulb, for example, was not the original invention that is sometimes depicted. It was, instead, a significant improvement on previous
light bulbs that did not last very long.65 The allowance of patents on improvements has the result of decentralizing
decisionmaking relevant to an initial invention. Though the
initial patentee still will own the pioneering invention, it will
not automatically own subsequent patents on all related inventions.66
A third example is the exception for parody in copyright’s
fair use doctrine.67 Under U.S. copyright law, parodies of a
work may be produced without the permission of the owner.68
One effect of this doctrine is decisional. Within the industry,
this allows parodists to decide independently whether they
want to invest in a parody project. The existence of the exception may reflect an intuition that the original author will make
poor assessments of the quality of works intended to humiliate
the author and degrade his work.
This Essay suggests that in construing the breadth of exceptions to intellectual property rules, a primary consideration
should be the facilitation of decentralized market entry made
possible by the exception. In the example of copyright’s fair use
doctrine, scholars have long argued that fair use is justified by
market failure. As Professor Wendy Gordon put it, fair use is,
and should be, employed to permit “uncompensated transfers

63 See generally Picker, supra note 27 (discussing the application of the Sony
test for contributory copyright infringement to a variety of digital distribution
technologies).
64 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1000–13.
65 See The Incandescent Lamp Patent, 159 U.S. 465, 470–74 (1895).
66 See Lemley, supra note 4, at 1009–10.
67 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
68 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (authorizing a parody of the song “Pretty Woman”).
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that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation
through the market.”69
While an important insight, what this should mean has
never been exactly clear, and we might restate the point
slightly. The analysis here suggests that copyright and patent
exceptions have a particular urgency when they can open
markets to decentralized improvement without permitting
misappropriation of the primary owners’ investments. That
may not be the only reason for calling usage “fair,” but from
this Essay’s perspective, it is the most important. In addition
to the parody exception just discussed, this analysis also supports the reverse engineering decisions, which prevent a copyright holder from using copyright to block prospective improvers of software.70
Conversely, the analysis here deepens the suspicion that the
economic (though not moral) case for copyright’s derivative
work doctrine is weak. In copyright, the fair use doctrine and
derivative work doctrine operate like twin sisters, respectively
opening and closing markets to decentralized improvement.
To take one example, copyright places the right to control
the development of films based on a novel in the hands of a
copyright owner. Why the right should be so allocated has
never been well explained in economic terms, although I grant
that such rights serve the moral rights of authors. From a
market perspective, the adaptation right blocks what would
otherwise be a competitive market in films based on a given
novel or underlying work.
As a derivative work doctrine is not necessary to prevent
primary misappropriation of the copyright work,71 the eco69 Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600,
1601 (1982).
70 See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding
reverse engineering of a copyrighted computer program for the purposes of
study as constituting fair use).

71

An argument can be made that the adaption right serves the interest of the
industry as a whole, and therefore, ultimately, the author. However this is not
clear, for the absence of the adaptation right would help some parts of the
entertainment industry and hurt other parts. It is not clear that in the aggregate that
entertainment industries would be smaller absent an adaption right.
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nomic defenses of adaptation rights have relied primarily on
preventing either races or redundant creation of works.72 For
example, some argue that if films based on novels were open to
any market entrant, races to bring films to market may result.
Similarly, others argue that an oversupply of derivative works
might lead to redundancy and “rent dissipation.”73 What these
arguments overlook is the fact that races and redundancy are
a normal feature of a decentralized market. As we said, two
gas stations on a single street corner are in a sense redundant,
but the alternative of a single, national gasoline station system
is unattractive. Similarly, a decentralized market process is
full of races. When minivans became popular, car companies
raced to bring minivans to market. When kung fu becomes
popular, studios dash to produce martial arts films. Rarely do
we think government intervention is needed to prevent such
behavior.

C. Dead Industries
A final insight generated by the analysis here relates to
“dead industries” or stagnant industries where technological
development appears stalled or nonexistent. Perhaps surprisingly, there are better arguments for assigning new intellectual property rights for such industries than in dynamic or
growing industries.
The reasoning is simple: In a dead industry, the dangers of
distorting a decentralized process of product development are
minimal. In addition, if profit margins by definition are thin in
a declining industry, it will be better to have only the very best
projects come to market. 74 (Stated otherwise, Type II errors
may have disastrous consequences.)

72 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 349 (1989).
73 See Michael Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy, 9 (Geo. Mason L. & Econ.
Res., Paper No. 03-03, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=374580.
74 This is similar to Professor Michael Abramowicz’s argument for strong
rights in copyright in general: prevention of “redundancy.” Michael Abramowicz,
An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
33, 72–75 (2004). I think, however, that Abramowicz is correct only in the declining market context.
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The incentive and deadweight loss effects of intellectual
property grants affects this analysis by fortifying the conclusion just reached. As Justice Stephen Breyer and others have
pointed out, the need to provide incentives for product investments depends strongly on the availability of returns from the
market.75 The stronger the market returns, the less government encouragement in the form of intellectual property rights
is needed. In a rapidly expanding industry, firms already have
strong incentives to bring a new product to market through
market returns and the advantages of being a first mover.
Meanwhile, the costs of an overly centralized decisionmaking
structure are greater. As a result, the desirability of intellectual property rights is at its nadir. In a dead industry, the
signs are reversed. The returns from the market are weak, so
government may need to provide incentives to encourage any
investment in product development at all. The case for strong
intellectual property rights is at its zenith.
This analysis of dead industries ignores an important
point— namely, that the industry may be dead not for independent reasons, but because of too many barriers to entry,
governmental or otherwise. In such a case, adding more rights
to the picture is unlikely to have the effects just discussed.
CONCLUSION
Of then-contemporary economic theory, Fredrick Hayek
wrote that “there is something fundamentally wrong with an
approach which habitually disregards an essential part of the
phenomena with which we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man’s knowledge and the consequent need for a
process by which knowledge is constantly communicated and
acquired.”76 Much of the economic reasoning surrounding the
grant of intellectual property rights has suffered from the
problem Hayek describes. It is implicitly or explicitly based on
unrealistic ideas of how firms and industries make important
75 Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 309–13
(1970).
76 Hayek, supra note 1, at 530.
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licensing, innovation and product development decisions. The
importance of understanding this problem cannot be overstated. Intellectual property assignments have become a central tool of economic policymaking in the twenty-first century,
administered across industries like a kind of performanceenhancing medicine. And as with medicine, a complete understanding of both the positive and negative effects of such assignments is critical to the design of a rational economic order.

